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FOREWORD

The Imazighen (plural of Amazigh) or Moroccan Berbers have been immigrating to Europe for a long time, particularly to France. Organised on a large scale from 1945, this immigration rose considerably from the 1960s.

The Berber language has suffered the full force of the effects of this migration. Devalued at home and not recognised in the host country, it degenerated and weakened. While there were excellent poets and storytellers among the first emigrants who made the most of the language of their birth, the language has since become enormously impoverished in subsequent generations, for lack of legal measures and institutional controls.

Another kind of Berber migration taking place at the same time weakened rural communities: the emigration of Berber Jewish communities who left the small towns and villages for Israel, Europe and North America from 1950-60. Their cultural heritage is one that has probably suffered the most remarkable disintegration and is the most harmful for Morocco’s present and future.

These questions of Moroccan Berber migrations played a central part in the 2014 colloquium organised in partnership with the Arab World Institute in Paris, and formed the third section of meetings organised by Jardin Majorelle’s Musée Berbère in Marrakech.

I would like to thank participants of the colloquium here, as well as those who have contributed to this work: Frédéric Abecassis, senior lecturer at the École Nationale Supérieure in Lyon, Pierre Bergé, chairman of the Fondation Jardin Majorelle, Kamal Hachkar, professor of history and filmmaker, Jack Lang, president of the institut du monde arabe, Claude Lefèbure, ethnologist at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Lahoussine Selouani, researcher, Yann Scioleto-Zürcher, historian and researcher at the CNRS and the CRFJ, and Ahmed Siraj, representative of the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad.

Björn Dahlström
Curator of the Musée Berbère, Jardin Majorelle
MOROCCAN IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE

LAHOUSSEINE SELOUANI

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MOROCCAN IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE

LAHOUSSEINE SELOUANI

This paper concerns the importance of migration flows between Morocco and France and undertakes to illustrate that Moroccan immigration to France is specific and localised, consisting of a migrant Moroccan labour force in the mining region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais (RNPC). This is an area traditionally known for the rotation of migratory flows of diverse nationalities, particularly immigrants who are, for the most part, originally from the south of Morocco. The majority are ethnic Berbers who represent the last great wave of non-European immigrants, which, paradoxically, the coal mines of the NPC region welcomed while the politics of decline in the region’s coal industry was underway.

From the start, this labour force benefited from the comparative advantage of flexibility and rotation (fixed contracts of 18 months). However, with the length of stay extending through renewable contracts, the Moroccan labour force had a tendency to stay put, thereafter driven by the demand for the well-known ‘miner status’ which their French colleagues were entitled to. Once acquired – notably in 1980 after a long battle – this led to the arrival in the region of huge numbers of women and children, mostly Berber-speaking.

My current argument opts for a simple and coherent structure, concentrating on three complementary approaches:

• A global review of the large flows of foreign immigration to France which we are not going to enlarge upon;

• The evolution of Moroccan immigration to France, the central basis of the colloquium;

• Migration of a family nature, illustrated specially by the arrival of families, notably the wives and children of the Moroccan miners in the NPC mining region.

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I - REVIEW OF FOREIGN MIGRATORY FLOWS TO FRANCE

Historical and demographical studies in this domain show that foreign immigration to France has a long history. It was already evident in the General Census of 1851, when foreigners were counted for the first time. There were 381,000 foreigners, slightly more than 1% of the total population (36,783,000).

In order to differentiate between the large migratory flows found in France, it is necessary to wait until the 20th century when we find that foreign immigration comes firstly from bordering and nearby European countries; secondly from countries further and further away, on the one hand for reasons of industrial development that relied more and more on the labour force, and on the other hand, a lowering of national demographic growth. But, while these flows developed and diversified, they were also managed and controlled according to the economic and political circumstances of the times.

SUCCINCT GLOBAL REVIEW

Until the beginning of the First World War (WWI), foreign immigration was composed mostly of a workforce from bordering European nations, namely Belgians, Italians, Spaniards, Germans and Swiss, who represented more than 80% of migration. It was also limited to the level of the countries they came from and often happened without any control and beyond all restrictive regulation, at least until WWI. This obliged the public authorities, via the Ministry of War – because of the exceptional circumstances of the war – to intervene and to organise recruitment of the labour force, essentially for the needs of national defence, armament factories, and the coal and steel industries.

Avec les deux guerres et leurs processus de reconstruction économique et de redressement démographique, se déclencha un processus d’organisation de l’immigration étrangère en France, de plus en plus diversifié et aux origines géographiques de plus en plus lointaines.

With two wars and the necessity of economic reconstruction and demographic recovery, a process of organised foreign immigration to France was triggered, becoming more and more diversified and from geographic regions further and further away.

Faced with the difficulty of finding the necessary labour force in a Europe devastated by the two wars, the French administration turned to its colonies. Thus Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Indochina became, beginning in 1915, providers of both soldiers and workers.

According to G. Mauco (Les Etrangers en France, A. Colin, 1932), the Ministry of Armament recruited more than 220,000 foreign workers between 1915 and 1918, including 132,000 North Africans, of which 78,000 were Algerian, 35,500 Moroccan and 18,000 Tunisian. This foreign immigration that had hardly begun in 1915 became one of the great migratory phenomena of the French economy after the war, as the results of inter-war censuses show:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Foreign Workforce</th>
<th>Proportion in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RP 1921</td>
<td>38,797,000</td>
<td>1,532,000</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP 1926</td>
<td>40,228,000</td>
<td>2,409,000</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP 1931</td>
<td>41,228,000</td>
<td>2,715,000</td>
<td>6.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP 1936</td>
<td>41,183,000</td>
<td>2,198,000</td>
<td>5.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE, population census.

With the effects of the economic crisis of the 1930s, as well as the flow from Africa, and particularly North Africa, the foreign population provided a large workforce during the first part of this period (2,409,000, or 6.6% of the total population in 1931). Foreign immigration started to become one of the concerns of political debate, notably leading to returns and repatriation of foreigners (Law of 10 August 1932 establishing quotas per profession). It was particularly in the wake of the Second World War (WWII) that we saw a quantitative and diversified renaissance of migratory flows to France, as witnessed by population censuses of the time.

After WWI, a huge call for foreign workers was implemented to deal with the immediate task of economic reconstruction and to rebalance the demographic deficit. But, in contrast to the 1920s when the State had left it to employers to organize all aspects of recruitment of the workforce through the offices of the Société Générale d’Immigration (SGI) created in 1924, now the monopoly on recruitment and control was in the hands of the State, by way of the Office National de l’Immigration (ONI), created on 2 November 1945, which applied more rigid regulations that employers viewed with some reticence.

The period from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s was one of economic growth leading to a large increase in the number of foreign workers in the principal industrial sectors, particularly in coal mines, steel, mechanical construction and building and public works.

To circumvent the rigid ONI procedures, employers began to remedy the situation themselves by employing foreign workers in France outside the official networks of recruitment.

As periodic censuses of the time show, the proportion of foreigners in comparison with the total population rose from 4.12% in 1954 to 5.28% in 1969, reaching 6.78% in 1982, before stabilizing at 6.1% in 2010. This is a period marked by an increase in workers from the Maghreb, notably Algerian and Moroccan, to the detriment of the European workforce, notably Italian and Polish.

However, the high immigration levels of the 1950s and 1960s would soon subside due to the 1970s crisis that led:

- First, making more difficult the regularization procedures (circular of 29 July 1968),
- Then, to the ‘provisional suspension’ of all new permanent work permits from 1974 (circular of 5 July 1974) with the exception of those coming from European Union member countries and those seeking political asylum.
The stabilisation of the immigrant population in the 1970s constituted the principal objective of migration policy in France, supported by the implementation of a series of restrictive measures (slowdown in permits, controls on length of stay, aid for those returning, restrictions on family members).

Since 1975, the restrictions have contributed more to the stabilisation of immigration rather than lessening it, seeing a constant decrease of immigrants from the whole of Europe in comparison with a slight increase in immigrants from further afield, particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, in particular from Morocco.

Family reunification in the last few decades has engendered some quantitative rebalancing of the foreign population between men and women, and a relative reduction in the average age of the immigrants. At the same time, with the lengthening of duration of stay, a tendency towards the demand for French citizenship has developed. As for geographic distribution, it is centred mostly in cities rather than the countryside, with almost 60% of the foreign population living in the three largest regions of France (according to RP figures in 1999: 37% Ile-de-France; 11% Rhone-Alpes and 10% Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur).

A temporary and short-term phenomenon in the eyes of the public authorities, foreign immigration to France has today led to the formation of fairly large stable communities living in the host country.

The case of Moroccan immigration is an illustration of this installation and stabilisation, despite the extent of movement between the host country and the country of origin and the relatively large amount of remittances to the country of origin. These remittances are today an important source of revenue for the necessary strategic development of the national Moroccan economy and for the support of local economies in the regions of origin where the extended families of migrants live. This has become a more and more significant dimension of migration in the socio-economic machinery of Morocco, requiring the Moroccan authorities to constitute administrative structures for their own management, notably through the creation at the beginning of the 1990s of a ministerial department charged with the concerns of Moroccans residing abroad.

Following this brief review of foreign immigration to France, what should be said regarding specifically Moroccan immigration to the country?
II - THE ROLE OF MOROCCAN IMMIGRATION IN THE LARGE MIGRATORY FLOWS TO FRANCE

Compared with the principal migratory movement of foreigners to France, Moroccan immigration to France is relatively old. In his book *Les Marocains en France* (Sirey, 1938), J. Ray places the presence of Moroccans in France from the second half of the 19th century. He talks of the stay of a certain Cherif of Ouezzane at theHôtel d’Orient in Marseille in 1852, and the opening in 1875, also in Marseille, of a business owned by Mr Lahlou, as well as a troupe of entertainers (surely the Sidi Ahmed ou Moussa Acrobats), directed by one Abdallah Soussi, various diplomats as well as some thirty Moroccan students sent by King Moulay Hassan between 1881 and 1891 to study languages.

Furthermore, according to this author, ‘the first Moroccans to be found working in France came from Oran: there were about a dozen of them employed in the metal industry in Nantes. Originally from the Souss, they had followed their Algerian fellow Muslims to France after spending some years in Oran … Marseille, no doubt, has some Moroccans amongst its dockworkers.’

Here are some further statistics from the 20th century:

- From the French Ministry of the Interior which counted 700 Moroccans on French soil in 1915, 13 100 in 1918, 3 000 in 1919, 7 000 in 1920, 9 000 in 1921, 10 000 in 1924, 15 000 in 1925, 21 000 in 1929 and 10 000 in 1936;
- From periodic population censuses in France indicating that, particularly from the second half of the last century, there were 16 468 Moroccans in 1946, 10 734 in 1954, 33 320 in 1962, 84 236 in 1968, 260 025 in 1975, 431 308 in 1982, 572 652 in 1990, 504 096 in 1999 and 434 958 in 2010.

Certainly beginning in 1912, the date of the start of the French Protectorate in Morocco, we know that Moroccan immigration started to grow in France. With the effects of the French occupation and the beginning of WWI, Moroccan immigration was estimated during the war years of 1914-18, as being between 15 000 to 20 000 Moroccans, following mobilization of the workforce for factories and as soldiers sent to fight. Highlighted during this period is the well-known Bordeaux landing of almost 4 000 Moroccan infantrymen, the number of Moroccans rising to 35 506 by the end of 1918, 20 000 in 1922 and almost 10 000 in 1936, according to estimations made by work carried out by J. Ray, G. Mauco, G. Spillman, P. Devillard, L. Justinard, de la Porte de Vaux, R. Montagne and D. Rivet. The vast majority of these Moroccan workers and soldiers were repatriated after the war, except for those who obtained authorization to prolong their stay or those who escaped the still sketchy legislation.

One can see that despite restrictions characterizing this period in France, and likewise in Morocco with the introduction of the Dahir (royal decree) of 27 October 1931 regulating the departure of Moroccan workers to France, Moroccan migration continued until it reached 21 000 in 1929, according to J. Ray, essentially to the mines and the automobile and electrometallurgy industries.
DISTRIBUTION OF MOROCCAN EMIGRANT WORKERS IN FRANCE ON 31 DECEMBER FROM 1925 TO 1931 IN SOME LARGE INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compagnie des mines de Roche la Molière et Firminy</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sté des Houillères de Montrambert et de la Béraudière</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble de mines du Nord-Pas de Calais</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etablissements des Automobiles Chenard et Walker</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compagnie Générale d'Électro-Métallurgie de Dives-sur-Mer</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>1385</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: results of research by J. Ray of French industries employing Moroccan workers.

Only at the coal mines (les houillères) in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, was there already a relatively significant number of Moroccan miners during this period, found mostly on the production lines, as the figures show.

DISTRIBUTION OF MOROCCAN MINERS IN MAJOR MINING COMPANIES OF THE NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS (1928-1935)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANICHE</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZIN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETHUNE</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRUAY</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLARENS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRESPI NORD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOURGES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCARPELLE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOUY-SERVIN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LENS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIEVIN</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSTRICOURT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICOIGN NOEUX ET DROCCOURT</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: table extracted from statistics from the ‘houillères’ by J. Ray, op. cit.
As for the Moroccan emigration zone, the south of Morocco was opened up by the Governor-General of the time (1912-1925), Marshall Louis Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) as the principal area of recruitment of ‘workers from the colonies’ for metropolitan France, without having to take indigenous workers from ‘Maroc utile’ or the profitable regions of Morocco who were useful for factories and large agricultural concerns managed by the French colonizers in Morocco. This is another aspect that could be interpreted as a way to reduce the resistance movement against the French at this time, by trying to make the population of the area economically dependent on emigration, notably through periodic remittances from the Moroccan immigrant workforce in France to their families in Morocco.

Regarding the scope of the migration movement, we must wait until the second half of the 1930s, on the eve of WWII and a period of attenuation of the effects of the crisis, and the coming to power in France of the Front Populaire in 1936, for migration to start to increase. WWII was an important moment in Moroccan immigration to France, as to an extent WWI had been. The preparation for hostilities launched again a huge appeal for a Moroccan workforce, notably in the creation in Morocco from 1938 of an emigration service, by the Dahir (royal decree) of 13 July 1938, to sign an agreement directly with the employers and to ensure the conveyance of the Moroccan workforce to France. Between October 1939 and June 1940, this specific service provided three contingents of 5,000 workers, of whom a third went to the mines and to the armament industry (cf. P. Devillard, L'Immigration marocaine en France, compte rendu de missions à la direction des offices du Maroc, juillet 1948-octobre 1951). As in the past, the south of Morocco continued to be a preferred area for recruitment.

The Office National de l'Immigration (ONI), created in 1945, recruited 4,000 Moroccan workers between 1946 and 1948, the majority from the south of Morocco, particularly for the French Coal Board and the steel industry in Longwy. The 1952 report of F. d'Achon from the Morocco office in Lille, entitled Moroccan Workers in the North and the Pas-de-Calais Regions, precisely detailed the recruitment preference zones, particularly the provinces of Agadir, Taroudant, Tiznit, Tata, Goulimine, Ouarzazate and Errachidia, by French businesses, especially the Coal Board. This is a process that continued in essentially the same areas, mostly rural, until the 1970s.
### DISTRIBUTION OF MOROCCAN MINERS BY RECRUITMENT ZONE IN THE MINING REGION OF DU NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS IN 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>AGADIR</th>
<th>TAROUDANT</th>
<th>TIZNIT</th>
<th>TATA</th>
<th>GOULIMINE</th>
<th>ERRACHIDIA</th>
<th>OUARZAZATE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>05</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1,314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Imouzzer : 01
- Angaia : 143
- Ait Baha : 01
- Tata : 02
- Bou Izakarne : 168
- Boudhia : 59
- Agdz : 07

Inezgane : 04
- Igherm : 32
- Anzi : 51
- Erfoud : 70
- Kalaia M’Gou-ma : 04

Tafingoula : 32
- Sidif Ifni : 05
- Goulimine : 40
- Errachidia : 41
- Ouazarzate : 08

Taliouine : 31
- Tafraoute : 32
- Goulimina : 32
- Skoura : 29

Tazoualta : 127
- Tiznit : 282
- Rich : 23
- Tagoumine : 14


At the same time as this organised and official immigration, there was clandestine immigration happening whereby workers from the east of Morocco and ‘Soussi’ workers from the south, working in French Algeria, could be considered as Algerians, following the Law of 20 September 1947 conferring French citizenship on Algerians and thereby allowing them entry into metropolitan France. This phenomenon was strengthened by the in situ legalisation of Moroccan soldiers as migrant workers by French employers for foreign workers entering France outside the official recruitment networks.

With the exception of a falling off of flow during the 1950s following political events allied to the independence struggles of the three countries of the Maghreb, immigration continued to increase, with an ethnic composition of Moroccan migration. Until then it was composed mostly of Soussis and generally workers originally from the south of Morocco, but this changed in that immigration came from all regions of Morocco, especially the north and northeast, to Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

During the 1960s, coinciding with a period of favourable economic growth and the beginning of the fall of ancient migration routes of European origin, there was a rise in the number of Moroccan migrants to France. This real turning point occurred on 1 June 1963, the date when Morocco signed a workforce agreement with France, regulating immigration to France, as shown in ONI data, as well as from other European countries such as Belgium, the
On the other hand, during the years 1990-2000, Moroccan emigration was oriented towards Spain, Italy, Canada, the USA and the Arabian Gulf countries. A prescribed broadening of Moroccan policy of diversification of destination countries denoted the choice for Moroccans for emigration as a variable in the fight against the problems of unemployment and as an important factor of economic and social regulation.

However, ONI data during the period 1960-1985 shows that there was a regular increase for Moroccan workers beginning in 1962 and for family migration from 1963. Moroccan migration continued to grow during the period of recession, especially family reunification that developed particularly during the 1970s and far exceeded the entry of stabilised workers. This tendency was maintained until the beginning of the 1980s when there was a sudden escalation following the policy of exceptional naturalisation applied once the Left came to power in France in 1981. In turn, this movement was halted by the application of the Decree of 4 December 1984, stipulating conditions that limited families joining foreign workers in France.

Demographic structure of the Moroccan community in France, contributing to the balance between men (52%) and women (48%), thereby confirmed the propensity of Moroccans towards long-term stays in France, despite the Moroccan immigrants’ strong attachment to their country of origin, rather than returning home, which France encouraged.

With a growing number of people, Moroccan immigration spread to all regions of France and also affected the entire territory of Morocco with varying intensity in different regions. Recent population censuses in France illustrate this phenomenon: Moroccan immigrants went from 1.5% of the foreign population (33,320 people in 1962, 3.2% in 1968, 7.6% in 1975, 11.6% in 1982 and reaching 15.9% in 1990, fell to 11.4% in 2010).

Consequently, with such large migration flows between Morocco and France, the ties are not only political and economic, but also human and cultural as shown by the statistics relating to Moroccan students studying at French universities, and to children of Moroccan immigrants enrolled in French schools.

According to figures from the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, the number of Moroccan students in France has grown considerably, increasing from approximately 8,000 in 1975-6 to 32,104 in 2012-13, or 11.1% of all foreign students (289,274).

In addition, according to statistics for the academic year 2012-13, almost half the foreign students are from the African continent, of which 23% are from the Maghreb.

For the same year, 2012-13, Moroccan students are the most numerous of foreign students enrolled in France – followed by Chinese students (10.5%), then Algerians (7.8%) and Tunisians (4.1%).

Foreign students account for 12% of all students and 41% of those receiving doctoral degrees.
Concurrent with these migration flows of Moroccan students, we find on French soil a number of young students from foreign immigrant families, resulting from the demographic effects of these families joining the workers over the previous years. These children attended schools at various levels of the metropolitan school system, particularly in public schools.

The first statistics on this matter from the Ministry of National Education begin with the start of the academic year in 1976. In 20 years, between 1980-81 and 2000-01, the number of foreign schoolchildren in public secondary schools only went from 307,388 pupils in 1980-81 to 412,226 in 1993-4, falling to 257,170 pupils in 2000-01, representing 5.8% in 1980-81 as opposed to 4.8% in 2000-01 as a proportion of the school population at a secondary level.

The progression in the number of Moroccan pupils during the same period is relatively significant within the school population of foreign origin, going from 24,802 (8.1%) to 91,571 (27.6%), then falling to 71,043 (22.2%) in 2000-01.

At the same time, Moroccan enrolment for the 2000-01 school year was concentrated primarily in five academies that themselves accounted for 43% of foreign pupils and 30% of Moroccan pupils: Académie de Versailles (9,204 Moroccan pupils / 40,236 foreign students); Académie de Lille (6,473 / 11,321), Académie de Montpellier (6,440 / 10,460), Académie d’Aix-Marseille (5,464 / 12,175) and Académie de Créteil (5,410 / 36,435).

Since the second half of the 1990s, a progressive decrease in the number of foreign pupils began to be noticed, following the movement towards naturalisation and the slowing of foreign immigration in general, so that at the beginning of the 2010-11 school year, enrolment of foreign pupils was just 151,518 (2.9% of all secondary school pupils) as opposed to 362,146 pupils (6.3%) during the 1995-96 academic year.
Family reunification has contributed to an increased female component and the reduction in the average age of the foreign population in France, particularly from Moroccan immigration and particularly since the 1970s, as opposed to migration for work, which has remained quite limited since 1974.

For Moroccan immigration, the increased volume of the last decades can be attributed mainly to family reunification, as indicated by ONI figures. In 1964 fewer Moroccan family members arrived in France than workers. These figures are largely reversed after 1974, the year that the Government Notification of 5 July 1974 was put in effect, limiting foreign immigration to France. This process continues to this day, despite limitations engendered by economic circumstances and the ruling government in place, which also contribute to the balance of the immigrant population by age (reduction of the average age) and by gender (female participation) of the Moroccan immigrant population.

According to the latest French census of 2010, the foreign population in France tends to balance out by gender (51% male/49% female as opposed to 52%/48% for the Moroccan immigrant population), although the majority remains male. At the same time, the composition according to age is skewed to the 55 years and older range, reaching 25.5% of the foreign population as well as of the Moroccan immigrant population.

The increased female component and the reduction of the average age of Moroccan immigrants, particularly Berber-speakers, are illustrated in one host zone with foreign workers: the Bassin Minier du Nord-Pas-de-Calais (the BMNPC, or the mining region of northern France). This area has seen successive waves of immigration from Morocco, beginning with the start of WWI and consisting mainly of Moroccans from the southern regions of the country.

With the fluctuating nature of foreign immigration to this mining region, there were close to 78,000 Moroccan miners, out of almost a million candidates, ‘selected’ in southern Morocco by the well-known ‘Mora’ which between 1956 and 1977 supplied various coal mines. They constituted the last wave of immigrants introduced to the area in large numbers by the NPC houillères (coal mines). Numbers at these mines evolved from 211 miners in 1928 to 159 in 1935, then from 1 314 in 1947 to 2 124 in 1960, reaching 11 634 in 1965 before starting to decrease, falling to 3 889 in 1980 to just 2 796 in 1987, out of a total of 11 645, as a result of the policies of progressive and programmed coal mine closures, of which the last closed in 1992.

The legendary ‘Mora’ was named after a certain Félix Mora, formerly in charge of ‘native affairs’, who became chief of recruitment of foreign workers for the houillères. Through his successive and sometimes intensive recruitment efforts among Moroccan workers from the rural south of the country, his name became well known in southern Morocco and symbolized immigration to France, coal mining and the suffering of families from whom he ‘wrenched’ the
young men for hard labour at the coalfaces.

Having left his mark on the Berber-speaking people of southern Morocco, with detrimental consequences caused by the emigration of young men on the socio-economic structures of the targeted rural zones, this man became the subject of poems sung by the Rwaïs (singers from the Souss such as Raïs Mohamed Dmssiri: as in his song *our n’samh I bariz our n’samh i dinor*, we will not forgive Paris, we will not forgive the North). The immigrant Soussi population held musical evenings during which the Rwaïs would recite poems relating the news of the country (*Tamazight*) and above all to the pain of emigration and exile, as elsewhere were performed popular Berber songs such as those of the famous women of Aït Atta. The songs denounced the ‘Mora’ as a slave driver who humiliated them, who viewed their villages as if they were stables; where the ‘Mora’ ‘recruiter’ could work with the support of local authorities, rounding up the young men and the not-so-young of the targeted zone. Then, making them stand up, bare-chested, lined up like soldiers under the sun, he selected the béliers (meaning ‘rams’ or ‘battering rams’, an expression used to describe the right type of man to work at the coalface) whom he then stamped on the chest like a beast (in green to signify his aptitude as a coalminer, or in red if he wasn’t suited for that line of work). After medical examinations at the Ain Borja centre in Casablanca, they were then transported by boat to Marseille, then by train to the cold of northern France and to hard labour in a mine.

These Moroccan miners obtained the famous ‘miner status’ in the 1980s which gave them new rights they had not enjoyed, in specific the ‘renewable 18-month contract’, notably the provision of housing and the right to family reunification and, by coincidence, with the exceptional naturalization offer of 1981, towards reunification with members of their own families left behind. This development led to the huge influx of women and children, newly arrived from the south of Morocco, to the communes and school districts of the coal mining area. For example, in 1982, the proportion of Moroccans arriving in France under the family reunification program represented more than a third of foreigners entering the country on a national level, and about three-quarters in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.

‘Miner status’ offered legal stability and social and material advantages, obliging social services of the houillères to allocate vacant homes from their housing stock to a rising number of Moroccan families; according to statistics from the HBNPC, this rose from 37 in 1975 to 140 in 1980 and 500 in 1983, reunifying more than 1900 families during this period alone, of which the majority were Berber-speaking.

During the same period, these new arrivals resulted in an increase of in the local school system (primary and secondary public schools), with the proportion of Moroccan students growing over the space of a dozen years from 12% of the foreign student population in 1976-77 to 47.5% in 1987-88. Although less pronounced, the same phenomenon is seen at a regional level (NPC region 10.2% as opposed to 37.4%) and at a national level (metropolitan France: 7.4% as opposed to 21.4%).

Newly arrived Moroccan families were grouped by geographic and ethnic affinity in the mining towns of the region. The families of Moroccan miners, the majority originating
from rural Berber-speaking areas, were often illiterate and much attached to their country of origin and their tribes. They in turn left their country following the heads of families who had emigrated, to alleviate the suffering caused by separation, the difficulties of mine work and simply a life in exile.

The reunification of families allowed Moroccan miners to enjoy a family life, eat traditional Moroccan food, watch their children grow up, and gave them the opportunity to transmit to their children, although at school and living in the host country, the rudiments of the Berber language and traditions and general Moroccan culture. This transmission, which was often heightened by a rite of returning to one’s roots in Morocco every summer, to consolidate links with the land, languages and cultures of the country of origin. These annual holidays often mixed socio-cultural elements (the purchasing of presents for family members and neighbours still in the country, the providing of financial aid for needy members of the tribe and local associations concerned with works such as the management of roads, electrification and provision of potable water, contributing to the mosque, the organising of events in the area such as weddings, and reactivating traditional local festivals; in short, a complete support of the whole social economy of which the Moroccan Berber immigrants were the inheritors) with a race against the clock with the Moroccan administrative bureaucracy to regulate their own administrative affairs. This ‘annual chore’ would continually apply pressure on Moroccan public authorities, notably demanding the installation of administrative offices.

Local traditions helped in the transmission of the Berber language and culture, particularly for children who were bilingual French/Berber, notably in speaking Tachelhit from the south of Morocco as well as bilingual French/Darija (Moroccan Arabic). One phenomenon seen while observing these children of Moroccan immigrants of Berber origin during their stays in Morocco was that, in addition to the language of the host country (or the country of birth) that they already spoke, they could also communicate well in their mother tongue, be that Tachelhit or Tarifite, as well as in Darija (Moroccan Arabic) while the language spoken at home was principally Berber. It was not a language mastered by the children, but one that allowed them to communicate with their own parents and other members of the family or tribe during their periodic trips back.

Even though these Berber-speaking Moroccan immigrant families were expatriated, they were attached to the language and culture, often with no specific support in the host regions. Moroccan Berber migration reunified a relatively significant number of residents’ associations and organisations to preserve the Berber language and culture which were able to contribute through their battles of the last few years, to the recognition of the Amazigh quality of Moroccan society. This was formalised by the creation of the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh (IRCAM) and the constitutionalization of Amazigh as an ‘official language of the State and common heritage of all Moroccans without exception’.

2 The objectives of the IRCAM are to unify the three Amazigh languages (Tachelhit, Tarifite and Tamazighte) by adapting the Tifinagh alphabet, in order to facilitate the task for all those who wish to learn this language. The activities of this organisation are – through academic research and the holding of colloquia on the Amazigh language and culture – the distribution of school textbooks in the Amazigh language, the translation of works and stories, and the publishing of works and research concerning the Amazigh language and culture. However, the programmes and activities of the IRCAM are not often praised by the Berber community in Morocco. The institute is criticised at times for its discordance with the demands of certain Berber activists and associations which advocate in particular an accelerated pace of formalisation, legalisation and the spread of the Amazigh language and culture in all the trappings of the Moroccan State and society.
Nevertheless, with the growth in immigration, lower transportation costs, and the accelerated development of new information and communication technologies, Moroccan immigrant families, particularly Berber-speaking, no longer found themselves as isolated as in the past, when they were limited to listening to the radio or audio cassettes of Berber music as a way of maintaining their links with the language and culture of origin. Radio and television broadcasts featuring the socio-cultural realities of Berbers, the production of DVDs of films, local events and shows featuring Amazigh singers and the establishment of a Berber television channel – have eased and accelerated many varied types of communication that contribute to and consolidate the maintenance of organic links.

The process of migration that has evolved in this new economic, social, cultural and technological environment can no longer be viewed as isolating the migrant from his origins, his family and his culture, as in the past. The development of more and more non-profit associations of various types, both in the country of origin and in the host country, constitutes a potential for the preservation and consolidation of the links and the strengthening of expression and claims of populations.

This phenomenon emphasises the significant failure of the policies of the country of origin in the organisation of language and culture courses. Essentially in Arabic literature, these courses are rarely available and are often only offered outside the official school timetable, usually on a Wednesday and Saturday afternoon and generally in unsuitable premises. The indifferent Moroccan teachers who present them are generally marginalised by school administrations.

Such unattractive and uninspiring courses and the overload they represent for children, as well as the content and teaching methods used, do not meet the expectations of the pupils or their parents. Not to be forgotten, too, is the ‘competition’ offered by Muslim religious education provided by the imams and preachers at the nearest mosque.

Paradoxically, with the halt in immigration that leads to the lengthening of stays at the same time as the arrival of women and children, the expectations of Moroccan immigrants evolve, transform and are defined by reference to the country of activity. Proof of this is found in the fact that the policy of assisted return has failed and not achieved the desired objectives. A financial argument, were it advantageous, to speed up the decision to return, would not be enough to resolve on its own the problems of social reintegration of Moroccan workers and their families into the country of origin where negative factors endure (lack of employment, low incomes, insufficient social aid and medical insurance), especially in the regions of Moroccan immigrants, rural southern areas.

Although subscribing to the immigration program from the start, for a large number of Moroccan immigrants, if not the majority, the fact of returning to the region of origin is seen as a sign of success. This is generally shown, at least for the first generation, by investing in property by building a house in the country, or the acquisition of housing in the suburbs of a large city and the opening of a business or a café in an area providing schooling and health facilities for better reintegration of women and children. Even if, with the exception of
some families with very strong ties or links to the country of origin, the Moroccan immigrant population continues to ‘unpack their suitcases’ where they have passed many years of their working lives, where the educational and professional future of their children is more or less assured, where the quality and availability of medical care and social protection, especially for aging parents, are available.

A retired Moroccan Berber miner sums up the problem with this insightful metaphor: *Tamazirt e zound l’hammam, adass our tmatalte, d’angiss our tmatalte* (The country of origin is like a hammam: we can’t be late going there, and we can’t linger either). In other words, to be attached to the country of origin to gain strength and to maintain links with the region of birth, at least for the first generation, is a necessary moral and emotional obligation and a symbolic debt to be honoured towards one’s place of birth. On the other hand, to return for good requires careful forethought since the conditions for return are not always all in place, neither for retirees nor their children. A return to the country (Tamazight) would in some way recall, consciously or unconsciously, the initial social situation before emigrating. However, this simple metaphor sums up in a few words, all the questions that must confront all immigrants one day, worker or student, after having spent many years in a foreign land.

At the same time, women – notably Berbers of rural origin – find themselves in the host country relatively free of various weighty, traditional constraints as well as difficult housework (cooking in a traditional oven, having to find water and wood kilometres away on foot); chores they do not want, and a way of life they no longer want for themselves or their daughters. Having experienced some of the privileges of urban life, they are more attracted to urban life than to a return to rural areas, where they would be at the mercy of the vagaries of the weather and a laborious daily life. Therefore, between ‘the absence of health facilities and the daily chore of collecting water and wood in the rural environment’ of the country of origin, and ‘being looked after in a hospital and enjoying shopping in an air-conditioned shopping centre nearby’ in the host country, the choice of where to live, for themselves and their children, is easily made.

As for the children of immigrants, being enrolled in school and familiar with the urban life of the West, they are generally not disposed or motivated to reintegrate themselves into the country of origin of their parents, even less so if the Tamazight (region of origin) is perched on a mountain far from urban centres and devoid of the fundamental needs of daily life available in the host country (schools, hospitals, potable water, electricity, good roads, leisure pursuits and socio-cultural entertainment).

Annual holidays in ‘at home’ lead young people, particularly young girls, to observe the evolution of Moroccan society and to make comparisons between conditions in the host country and those of the country of origin that often lead to the difficult dilemma of choosing between the societies with relatively different values: an Arab or Berber Muslim one with a rural and traditional background, and one that is westernised, modern, urban and non-religious.
They are sometimes split between traditional cultural values transmitted within the family and the more attractive cultural values of the host country where they live, where women are perceived as free, active and independent. Such a situation sometimes creates disagreement or even conflict with the parents (especially fathers) and older brothers, who want to preserve the values of identity and culture while the girls aspire to an enhanced status for women in the Islamic world, in any case one different to that of their mothers. This phenomenon could continue, especially when religious revival is becoming more noticeable in the socio-cultural sphere of both the country of origin and the host country, justified as a cultural right and an essential aspect of identity in the face of ethno-social marginalisation and a policy of exclusion, which both impact Muslim immigrants.

The majority of young people, speaking the language of the host country and influenced for the most part by its culture, conveyed particularly by the media and education system, the language and culture of origin of family born in Morocco, particularly Berbers, are doubly penalised by the marginalisation of the national language, as is the case in the country of origin. Consequently, the Amazigh language and culture is practiced less and less, particularly by this generation of children whose parents were immigrants who themselves spoke the language of origin like their parents (the first generation) spoke the language of the host country. This phenomenon is emphasised in the settlement areas of the Moroccan Berber-speaking immigrants by both a lack of linguistic policy in the country of origin and structured, organised association networks with resources to match their ambitions.
CONCLUSION

To conclude, I must emphasise that migratory phenomena are complex and that the behaviour of immigrant populations evolves in time and space, which presupposes the participation of all the disciplines concerned. We hope this report has shed light on some dimensions of the reality of Moroccan immigration, particularly to France and especially to the mining district of Nord-Pas-de-Calais as an illustration of migratory movement with provenance in the south of Morocco, in the context of the dynamic history of the labour-intensive coal industry, which employed a foreign workforce.

Moroccan miners, often young rural bachelors, and who were believed to be docile, illiterate and disciplined (in the sense that they were not unionised) triggered, to the general surprise of the mining companies and the Moroccan consular authorities who controlled them locally, protest movements in the 1980s that can be called historic, in order to gain better social treatment from the mining companies, in particular obtaining the ‘miner-status’ so that they could claim the same rights as French miners and have the liberty to choose whether to return to their country of origin or settle in the host country.

The resolution of these two major protests by the mining companies quickly restored order and, as a result, the physiognomy of Moroccan immigration to the mining region, evolving from immigration that was predominantly male and provisional to family immigration and settlement, which profoundly changed the demographic structure in the mining area.

Today the situation of Moroccan miners is no longer a question of returning to their country of origin, but more one of social integration: of fathers, now retired miners; of mothers as well as wives, often illiterate, who struggle to maintain solid links with the Berber language and culture, particularly by transmitting it to their offspring; of children, both young students or future young job-seekers, who share both the original culture of their parents and the culture of the host country.

Moroccan immigrants in France generally find themselves confronted by difficulties of a different nature, with more complex dimensions: those related to their cultural identity. The attachment of Berber-speaking people to their ancestral culture constitutes an important factor in the preservation and transmission of the language and culture of origin. This factor is increasingly mobilising Berber associations both in Morocco and in France, that bring together a strong Moroccan Berber community thereby urging the relevant Moroccan authorities to accelerate the pace of promotion of Amazigh culture both at school and university level in the host country where Moroccan immigrants are located. The authorities include the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), although this organisation is not always in sync with the Berber associations, at least in terms of political strategy. The pace of such promotion of Amazigh culture must be adjusted in a manner appropriate to the specific realities of the immigrant population.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


OVERVIEW OF MOROCCAN JEWISH MIGRATION: INTERNAL MIGRATION & DEPARTURES FROM INTERNAL MIGRATIONS TO DEPARTURES FROM MOROCCO

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**Fig. I**

Oil lamps used during Hanukkah.

Glazed terracotta and stone. Draa Valley.
BIography

OVERVIEW OF MOROCCAN JEWISH MIGRATION: MIGRATION & DEPARTURES FROM INTERNAL MIGRATIONS TO DEPARTURES FROM MOROCCO

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The history of Moroccan Jews during the French colonial period is unique\(^1\). From a political viewpoint and alone amongst their counterparts across North Africa, they did not benefit from collective naturalisation (as was the case with Algerian Jews who became French in 1870); nor did they have easy access to French nationality (as was the case in Tunisia from 1910). The vast majority of Moroccan Jews remained subjects of the Sultan. In addition, the law of *Dhimmi* determining their status remained in force even though it fell into disuse after the French conquest in 1912\(^2\). Jewish communities in Morocco underwent great social, economic and cultural upheavals during the forty-four years of the French Protectorate. The creation of authorities representing their communities, the development of educational structures in French and Modern Hebrew, the introduction of a capitalist economy and major internal migration of the population towards urban centres were also elements that transformed the traditional balance of Moroccan Jewish life. This last was indeed multicultural: Jews from the north, particularly from Tangier, had maintained important links with Spanish culture and felt themselves to belong to a certain cultural elite. Those from the towns such as Casablanca, Fez, Meknes and Rabat had largely resided in the mellah, separate urban areas. There they practised business and artisan activities. Lastly, the Jewish Berbers from the mountains (the Rif and the Middle, High and Anti-Atlas) and the valleys of the Souss were split geographically into small rural communities, market towns and villages. There they led a life of interaction with secular Amazigh culture. Rural mellah were not widespread. Professions were those of peddling, artisanship and food production. Moroccan Jews declined in many communities,

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1 This article owes much to my numerous and passionate collaborations with Professor Yaron Tsur of the University of Tel Aviv.

2 This term refers to a non-Muslim citizen living in an Islamic country. In exchange for payment of certain taxes, for certain legal restrictions and in respect of certain obligations, such people were able to guarantee their personal and family safety.
mostly poor. French colonisation was to lead to their destabilisation and in the end led to international migration, mostly to Israel.

I. TRADITIONAL LIFE UNDERMINED DURING FRENCH COLONISATION

In an article published in 1963, the historian Haïm Zev Hirschberg recalls that the history of the Berber Jews is often constructed around the romantic fantasy of Kahina, a Berber queen who was a symbol of resistance in the Maghreb against the Arab conquest, making the Berber Jews descendants of one of the ten lost tribes of Israel [Hirschberg, 1963: 318]. But beyond this idealised approach, the existence of Jewish communities in Berber country since the 9th century has been proved. These people shared with their neighbours the same living conditions, the same vernacular language, and some customs (particularly marriage) [Taïeb, 2004]. However, one should not imagine that these communities were isolated from the rest of Morocco. We know about their ancient habits of travelling around, particularly with regard to their commercial activities. But it was with French colonisation that this traditional way of life was broken apart, well before the country’s independence.

It is difficult to determine the precise number of the Moroccan Jewish population and amongst them, the part represented by ‘Berber Jews’. Censuses of the population conducted by the French authorities are patchy. Jewish populations of small localities are not listed. However, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JOINT), an American Jewish association concerned with aiding Jewish communities after Shoah (immigration to Israel) estimated that there were 240,000 Jews in Morocco after WWII [Tsur, 2002: 30].

The historian Yaron Tsur also recalls that in 1951 there were more than 300 communities in which Jews lived. More than 70% of them lived in the 15 largest cities of the country; Casablanca alone had almost a third of the total Jewish population. This concentration should not, however, mask a large dispersal of the population: 30% lived in market towns and villages, of which about 10% in remote hamlets. The towns of Sefrou, Midelt and Missour as well as the villages of Aït Tagala, Tagardirt and Talsint, amongst others, still retain traces of this presence today. Along the byways one finds mellah, cemeteries and ksar long-abandoned, today protected and even restored by the Moroccan state. All witness the importance of rural Judaism that is celebrated today through various rural pilgrimages and cultural practices honouring local saints [Ben-Ami, 1990]. Nevertheless it would be erroneous to think that the geographical isolation of these populations lessened the upheavals of the colonial era.

The Alliance Israelite Universelle opened their first school in 1862 in Tetouan. This network of educational establishments aimed at the Jewish communities of the Mediterranean teaches in French and gradually disengages the population from their local culture. Twenty-five were created just in 1911 in the main towns of Morocco (notably Tangier and Fez in 1881, Casablanca in 1897 and in Meknes in 1910). From the time of the establishment of the French Protectorate until WWII, 21 supplementary schools were opened. Henceforth the teaching of
French spread to remote areas of the coastal regions and those more difficult to access (Sefrou in 1914, Midelt in 1928 and Taroudant in 1929) [Rodrigues, 1991: 37-38]. Even if not all Jewish children went to school, this new teaching as well as other forms of modern education notably in Hebrew, would gradually dissociate Jewish children from the heder, the traditional schools where their parents had learned the rudiments of Judaism and local Jewish culture.

Beyond these cultural changes, economic upheavals would lead to a questioning of traditional life and encourage significant movement to urban centres of the country: firstly towards Marrakech and then Casablanca. Populations left their villages because of climate hazards, difficulty in cultivating the land but more often because of a drop in earnings from peddling and artisanship. The geographer André Adam analysed that the migration of Jews towards urban centres began at the end of the 1920s. The city of Marrakech first received a large number of internal migrants from the villages of the Atlas and the valleys of the South. Job opportunities were soon exhausted and further flows of people headed for Casablanca which was then expanding economically. In 1951, 16 700 Jews lived in Marrakech and 74 000 in Casablanca [Tsur, 2002: 172]. The particularly insecure Jewish population settled in poor urban neighbourhoods and did not return to their home villages that had little to offer them. The following extract describing the poverty of the Jews of the Marrakech mellah is by Elias Canetti during his stay in the city in 1953 [Canetti, 2007: 51; Leroy du Cardonnoy, 2005]:

‘The deeper I went into the Mellah the more I discovered that all became increasingly miserable. I left the silk and fine fabrics behind me … Close to the gate into the souk was an area of some luxury; a distinct separation of the people was at play here …’

Another commentary on the Jewish condition follows, from the pen of Haïm Zeev Hirschberg in his work Au pays du soleil levant, addressing the difficulties of the Berber Jews who ‘stayed in their villages’. Although the author was partisan to their departure for Israel, he nevertheless witnesses difficult social realities when visiting very poor villages:

‘We are in Agoyin, a poor Berber village some 130km from Marrakech … We were invited to visit the mellah … At first we went into the courtyard of a jeweller. In a little alcove on the left was the workshop: barely furnished, a small hand bellows and a few very simple tools. I caught sight of the living room. Again, hardly any furniture. Two mattresses spread on the floor, a small table and a lot of rubbish and filth. The refuse accumulated in the courtyard, too. The jeweller’s wife is the daughter of the rabbi, who is also the ritual butcher and tutor for the community which numbers about a hundred souls. She took us to the Tsla [synagogue] at the upper end of the village where we found her father, R. Yaich Abou Chakila. … I saw about ten boys aged between 5 and 12 sitting on the ground studying the Parshah for the week. Next to the entrance of the Tsla another door led to a large living room. It’s difficult to call this space a room; it would be better to describe it as a cave were it not for the roof overhead that was supported by a wooden column in the middle of the room. The place had no window; it was lit only by the doorway. I went inside. It was a large space and leaving it one came upon alcoves along the sides that served for storage and for sleeping. There again, no furnishings except for mats and blankets. … At that time of day, all the young people were working. Some were tanners, some cobbler, merchants or peddlers who plied their trade in
the nearby villages. Some of the Jews of Agoyin own tiny parcels of land on which they grow a few vegetables; the earth is stony and dry. The ‘richest’ of them have cows, the poor have sheep. … As night fell we returned to Ouarzazate, and left for Taznakht at dawn the next day … Forty-two Jewish families live there, numbering about 300 people. Some of the houses have two floors. The homes we visited were spacious, well presented, with large rooms, windows and furniture: chairs, tables and beds. It is clear that their situation is better than that of other mellah that we had seen up to then. They have plots of land with figs and vines. There, too, the Jews are engaged in all professions: tailoring, sewing, jewellery; but there is not one carpenter. […] We visited the old Tsla […] The Ark of the Covenant was decorated with pretty wooden ornaments painted in the Berber style. I learned about safety conditions. I wondered how a Jew could set off alone on these deserted and isolated roads, far from main routes. The answer surprised me: as far as could be remembered, there had never been any act of robbery in these parts, in fact not one case in the whole region. I got similar responses elsewhere.3

In the middle of the 20th century the Berber Jews, in common with their Muslim neighbours, experienced a profound change in traditional village structures that led them en masse towards the towns. But as in the case of their fellow Jews in other parts of Morocco, they were faced with a cultural development that distanced them collectively from their mother tongues, Arabic and Berber, and pushed them therefore, in accordance with political planning, to refute the place that they had traditionally held in Moroccan society. According to Yaron Tsur, the Jews of Morocco were before long split into separate parts: ‘the European sector’ consisted of Jewish populations who had largely benefited from foreign nationality (Spanish, Portuguese, British and French) but who above all, in speaking both Arabic and a European language, played an intermediary role between Moroccans and foreign powers. This ‘western sector’ consisted of the middle class population who, although not of French nationality, spoke the language and had largely lost their Arabic. ‘The indigenous sector’ was the most numerous, consisting of those Jews who did not necessarily speak French, but whose children may have received the boost of an education in Hebrew; these were of working class background and poor. This division of the population explains the migratory movements to follow: the majority of households of the ‘indigenous sector’ going to Israel while the better-off went to western countries.

3 Quoted by Yaron Tsur, *Une communauté déchirée, les Juifs du Maroc et le nationalisme*, op. cit. In Hebrew.
Fig. II

Jewish ‘hand of Fatima’ or Khamsa. Engraved silver.

‘Khamsa’ means ‘five’ in Arabic. Protective salamander on a six-pointed star, also known as Star of David or Seal of Solomon. This symbol represents life, health and wisdom in Muslim, Jewish and Christian religions.
Inscribed: “In memory of David A. B. Ben Iflah. In honour of the great rabbi, celebrated for his miracles: Rabbi Amran Ben Diwane.” The rabbi’s tomb at Ouezzane in the Rif, where he created a yeshiva (Talmud study centre) and died in 1782, became an important place of pilgrimage for the Jews of Morocco.
II. INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION

The emigration of Moroccan Jews to Mandatory Palestine began in both a Zionist and religious philosophical context in Casablanca in 1919, to be followed by Fez in 1922 [Tsur, 2012]. Those leaving were encouraged both by a difficult social situation and by religious belief in their links with the Holy Land and the city of Jerusalem. 350 people left Casablanca at that time and experienced great difficulty in integration. Those from Fez, about 500 people, were of very modest background. They followed a small group of Jews from Sefrou. Again, their integration was a failure. After this, emigration to Palestine stopped and was not to be repeated for another thirty years, until the great waves of emigration of 1947, 1954 and 1961. That was in a completely different context: the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the independence of Morocco in 1956.

Between 1948 and 1956, 90,000 Jews emigrated and there were only 170,000 remaining in the country. Zionist ideology, both religious and messianic, contributed to creating the migratory flow towards the young Jewish state. The Jewish Agency was established in Morocco in 1955. Until 1964 it organised semi-legal departures, then illegal departures after 1959, of about 97,000 people. These insecure populations, mostly originating in the mountains and now settled in towns, were susceptible to Zionism seen as redemption [Tsur, 1998: 325]. It was also a period of political transition in which Zionism was roundly condemned by the Arab League and then by Morocco, and which implicitly demanded Moroccan Jews to make an ideological choice. The departures during the 1970s were themselves tied to internal political events in Morocco and impacted those more financially secure. The flow towards Israel slowed as a result of the difficulties of integration experienced by the migrants. From that time on, migratory routes became diversified. The middle class bourgeoisie in business and the liberal professions went to France. Other flows of about 15,000 people turned to Quebec in Canada where their French gave them the right to settle [Messika, 2012; Cohen & Scioldo-Zürcher, 2014].

The period least documented by historians remains the decade of the 1950s that saw a synergy for Jewish migratory aspirations between fear of the political transition as Morocco gained independence (and the fear of an eventual application of Dhimmitude) and The Jewish Agency, promoting and organising departures on a large scale. The flows that were then directed towards Israel are interesting to observe as they expose the beginnings of the accessibility of Jewish emigration that first started by influencing the populations originally from the mountains and often settled in urban areas.

The map below identifies the 232 places of residence of 15,443 migrants who left for Israel between August 1955 and August 1956. It can be seen that all regions of Morocco are

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4 Morocco banned Jewish emigration in 1959. After that, it became illegal.

5 The maps presented in this article are from a survey being carried out by Professor Yaron Tsur and myself on the migratory pathways of Moroccan Jewish migrants. Represented on the map are data concerning 70% of migrants leaving for Israel between August 1955 and August 1956.
affected by these departures: urban and rural, the coast and the mountains. Also represented is the distribution of rural Jews, mostly Berber, in the valleys of the Drâa and the Moulouya, and the high plateaux of the Atlas. Although most of the rural mellah have disappeared today, this ‘quasi archaeological’ map recalls the importance of the Moroccan Jewish component in the history of Morocco. Also, half of them resided in urban areas: unsurprising considering the dynamics of internal Jewish migrations, 27% lived in Casablanca, 9% in Marrakech, 6% in Meknes and Rabat-Salé, and 4% in Fez. Moreover, it can be seen that a large number of people left their communities in the small towns and villages. 182 left Midelt, a significant number for a small town in the Atlas. In addition, 101 people left Rissani and 38 left the village of Ighilbiane.

These migrants were largely young households with an average of four children, amongst whom the number of men and women was the same. 99.9% of these people were Moroccan nationals (just 18 of them were French and four described as Israelis). 54% of these migrants were less than 15 years old. In addition, 75% of women and 40% of men over the age of 15 were unemployed. Their jobs were principally artisanal (33%), farming (4%) and employed (2%). The qualified professions were not represented here. It can be clearly seen, then, that this was a departure of people of low income and with little qualification. Among the 74 migrants who left Aït Tagant, 58 did not list a profession, 12 described themselves as fellah (peasants), four were merchants and artisans (a seamstress, a shoemaker and two having small businesses).

Source: Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem), Department of Aliyah (S6), assembled by Pr Yaron Tsur.
Moreover, if the birthplaces of these migrants are compared to their places of residence, the internal mobility of the Jewish population of Morocco can be seen. Just 27% of these individuals listed resided in a place that was not their birthplace. This low figure is explained by the large number of children under the age of 15 who were born in the town resided in by their parents. Also, 36% of people older than 20 had experienced a move.

The second map shows the birthplaces of the migrants who lived in Casablanca at the time of their emigration. Just 36% of these residents had not been born in Casablanca. But 57% of those over the age of 20 were not natives of the city. Considering the large flow of people moving from Marrakech to Casablanca, it can be seen that the attraction of Casablanca was strong for all Moroccan Jewish populations, including those originally from the southern regions and from the Moroccan Anti-Atlas. All the small villages ‘contributed’ inhabitants to the economic capital of the country, such as Ighil Nogho to the southeast of the town of Ouarzazate. These people settled mostly in the mellah of the city and did not return to their home villages, unlike the Muslim population from the same regions.
Map 2: Birthplaces of migrants resident in Casablanca at the time of their emigration between August 1955 and August 1956

Source: Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem), Department of Aliyah (S6), assembled by Pr Yaron Tsur.
The second wave of Moroccan emigration to Israel began in 1954-55. The ‘Zionist migration field’ was considerably enlarged and included firstly the most insecure of Jewish populations. Villages started to empty and then became completely abandoned by their Jewish inhabitants. In their wake, the urban populations also began to leave. More than 70% of Moroccan Jews left to settle in Israel. In the face of this enormous arrival, the young Jewish state initiated a migratory policy known as ‘from boat to village’. This consisted of avoiding the mass settling of people in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem where 70% of the Jewish population of the country were concentrated (respectively 44%, 15% and 12%), and organised the allocation of people to isolated areas where state services were not yet fully established and the possibilities for education and social care was limited. This contributed to the difficulties of integration of these poor populations who were still very much attached to the kingdom they had just left. In Israel today, ‘the memory of Morocco’ remains dear to the families who left it.

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6 This policy consisted of the immediate transport of migrants by bus or taxi to the places to which they were allocated.
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TINGHIR JERUSALEM: ECHOS FROM THE MELLAH

DOCUMENTARY FILM DIRECTED BY

KAMAL HACHKAR

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PRODUCED BY FILMS D’UN JOUR, 2M AND BERBERE TV 2012, 86 MN
IN BERBER, DARJIA, FRENCH, HEBREW AND ENGLISH

SUBTITLES IN FRENCH, ENGLISH, SPANISH, ITALIAN AND HEBREW
BIOGRAPHY

Kamal Hachkar is a young French-Moroccan writer and director. Born in 1977 to Muslim Berber parents, he left his native land with his mother at the age of 6 months to join his father who had immigrated to France in 1968. His childhood was punctuated by the frequent relocation of his labourer father, both within France and abroad. Constantly moving with his family engendered sympathetic feelings in the young man for those exiled or uprooted.

He studied history at the Sorbonne, and gained a degree in the medieval history of the Islamic world. In 2005 he obtained a teaching degree and became a teacher.

Interested in the Jewish culture and heritage of Morocco, he wanted to research this culture in both Israel and Morocco. He learned to speak Hebrew through the organisation Parler en Paix (www.parlerenpaix.org). He organised cultural evenings with Jewish and Arab poets, as well as debates that brought Israeli and Palestinian students together, encouraging them to reflect on their ideas of identity and membership in a clan or tribe.

In 2012 he directed his first documentary, Tinghir Jerusalem: Echoes from the Mellah. From the point of view of an exile, the film follows the destiny of the Jewish community that left the Berber village of Tinghir in Morocco during the 1950s and 60s. Originally from this village, Kamal Hachkar takes us to the crossroads of cultures and presents the songs, voices and stories of this double identity shared between Jews and Muslims.

This first film has been selected at numerous festivals across the world and has won many prizes. It was shown during prime time on the Moroccan television channel 2M. In Morocco, it has provoked a healthy debate concerning Moroccan dual identities. In Tangier, it won the prize for a first work at the Festival National du Film. Kamal Hachkar is currently working on two documentaries – one on the Jewish-Moroccan music of Jewish and Muslim youth, and the other on Amazigh identities.
SYNOPSIS

‘In France, I grew up with the idea that all Berbers were Muslim. But in Tinghir, my native town in the Moroccan High Atlas Mountains, the tales my grandparents told me revealed that some Berbers were Jewish. At the beginning of the 1960s, after more than 2000 years of shared history, all these Jews left the Atlas, down to the very last one. So I started with the shattered memory of the generation who had known this Jewish presence, and soon found that my research would take me to Israel where I found some of the original families from Tinghir. With them, between Israel and Morocco, Tinghir Jerusalem: Echoes from the Mellah resonates with the songs, voices and history of the Jews and Muslims of this shared double identity.’

‘Every culture is born of mixing, meeting and confrontation; quite the opposite, it is isolation that destroys civilisations.’ Octavio Paz

PROLOGUE

During my childhood, Tinghir was the place for holidays – a return to my country of origin. I really loved this village where I was born and which always made me feel like I was travelling back in time. The ancient history of a Jewish presence in my town had haunted me for years. It would take me back to my Berber roots and allow me to rehabilitate this identity. The words of my maternal grandparents spurred my interest in this double lineage. Every summer, I would question them and I came to realise through their words that a world, a social universe, had disappeared.

The wrenching of these Jews from their land echoes my own family’s history: that of the emigration of my parents, the only difference being that we still have a place and family living in Tinghir.

One day I went to visit my mother’s uncle at Kerrando, a small town close to Gourrama and Rich, where I was able to meet for the first time a member of the Jewish community and to experience the intimacy of a Jewish home. There are still two such families in Rich; essentially the family lives in Casablanca and the men stay there for business. Listening to him talk, seeing photographs of rabbis on the walls, I realised it was all part of the history of Morocco.

Having watched Israeli films, I wanted to approach the complex reality of this country, no doubt with the secret wish of finding the Jews of my native town. In 2005 I decided to take my first trip to Israel and to learn Hebrew through the association Parler en Paix, which offers one the opportunity to learn Arabic and Hebrew at the same time. I already spoke Berber and Darija, or Moroccan Arabic, both languages that I often heard at home, even if my parents usually spoke in French. During a trip organised by this association in 2007, an unexpected meeting took place in a village in Galilee.
NOTE WRITTEN AFTER A SECOND TRIP TO ISRAEL IN 2007

We arrived in a small village in the north of Galilee called Pki’in. It’s a cosmopolitan village with Jews, Druze and Arabs. Strangely it made me think of a village in the Moroccan High Atlas. We stopped for a coffee where Druze women were making traditional bread. An impression of being in the Moroccan countryside.

We sat in the sun on the terrace. Our guide Yossi is a Moroccan Jew, born in Casablanca. We quickly got along. He had great nostalgia for the period I was researching. And then, in the village, he met an old friend with whom he had fought in the Yom Kippur war, another Moroccan Jew, also called Yossi. My guide introduced us, telling him that I was born in the south of Morocco. We talked in Arabic and in English. He was born in Israel (later becoming a lawyer), but his parents were born in the foothills of the Atlas. My curiosity piqued, I asked him where. I was amazed to hear that his mother came from the same village as me, Tinghir, a small village lying between the High and the Anti Atlas Mountains at an altitude of 1500 m.

We exchanged email addresses and phone numbers. He seemed moved, as was I. After all this time of dreaming of meeting a Jew from my town … We promised to write; he invited me to lunch at his house near Tel Aviv to meet his mother, but we didn’t have time. Another time …’

This encounter was the foundation of my desire to make a film about these absent Jews.

Two years after meeting Yossi Ben Chetrit, I arranged through my guide to see him again. On Monday 23 February 2009, I met Yossi Ben Chetrit’s mother for the first time. She was from Tinghir and had lived in the village until 1952 when she left with her four children. Memories returned of the language, the Berber songs, names of family members, slices of life with those who had been their protectors. Another person, Sebbag’s son, had left Tinghir in
1964 at the age of 8, and had attended the mixed school. He remembered the reasons why they left. Talking to them I rediscovered the names and histories that I had already found in the diplomatic archives in Nantes.

All these moments of shared memories convinced me of the necessity of relaying this heritage which was in danger of disappearing, and to fill, as far as possible, the vacuum left in a collective Moroccan memory by the departure of the Jewish community.

**A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

‘Life brings us together; only religion separates us’ - Berber song

The presence of Jews in Morocco stretches back to antiquity, more precisely to Roman times. In Tinghir, as in all Berber regions in southern Morocco, it is thought that the presence of Jews goes back to the destruction of the first Temple by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 BCE. This is one of the most ancient Jewish communities in Morocco. Legend says ‘the Torah came out of Taourirt, and the holy word from Asfalou’: these are two hamlets near Tinghir.

Islam came to Morocco in the 7th century, and the ‘people of the book’ achieved the status of dhimmi, which means protected. This status gave both Jews and Christians protection and freedom of worship as long as they respected the domination of Islam and paid a tax per person, called the djizia. In return, their security was assured by their protector, the sultan or caid.

In some Berber villages the mellah (Jewish quarter) was separated from the Muslim area by a wall with a gate. But often, as in Tinghir, the term just meant a few streets inhabited by Jewish families where the synagogue could be found. In Tinghir they mostly lived in the Ihartane district where I was born, at Asfalou and at Ait Ourjdal, the jewellers’ district. Jewish houses abutted Muslim houses. There were no boundaries, either on a spatial or an imaginary level.

Jewish life in Morocco alternated between periods of calm and goodwill and moments of persecution. All depended on the socio-economic situation and on the reigning dynasty. For the most part, the Jewish minority lived in harmony with the Muslim majority.

In 1492, many Jews who had been expelled from Spain and Portugal settled in Morocco. From that time, distinction was made between the Toshavim, or native Jews who had been in Morocco since antiquity, and the Megoraschim, the descendants of those exiled from Spain.

The Jews of southern Morocco were ruled by the law of dhimmi (protected persons) but it seems that the law was more flexible than in previous times because of the absence of a strong central government. These regions were known by the term blad al-siba, which means areas of dissidence, as opposed to blad al-makhzan, areas that were pro-government. The French only took control of Tinghir in 1931 due to the resistance of Berber tribes.
At Tinghir, as in other Berber villages, the protection of the Jewish community fell to the tribal leader. Each Jewish family had a Muslim family to protect them. This system worked because of the important role played by Jews in the rural economy. The Jews were merchants, peddlers and itinerant artisans. In time, goldsmithing and silversmithing became such Jewish trades that the term iskaken – jewellers – became synonymous with Jewish. As they were businessmen, they often played the role of banker (my paternal grandfather was only able to leave for France with a loan from a member of the Jewish community).

Jews and Muslims shared the same languages and culture, listened to the same music and sang the same songs. Jews shared common customs with their Muslim neighbours involving clothing, food and the worship of saints. Ties were close, with just a few distinctions – particularly headgear (a black fez for men) and very strict religious limits. There was no intermarriage, even if love stories between Jews and Muslims must have existed. My grandmother often said that Jews were not allowed to eat meals prepared in non-kosher houses. But they could eat eggs, olives, honey, oil and dairy products. In Tinghir, Jews spoke Berber and Arabic. We even found a Passover Haggadah written in Berber, a sign of this acculturation. On the first night of Seder Jews recite the Haggadah to commemorate the exodus from Egypt and the liberation of the Hebrew people from the pharaonic yoke.

The Jews of the Atlas were very religious and believed in the Messiah. Three times a day they would recite the prayer, ‘May our eyes behold your return to Zion’.

There are few traces left of the two hundred Jewish communities of the High Atlas villages. Two-thousand-year old communities disappeared in the 1950s and 60s, with the last Jews of Tinghir leaving in 1964. In this town the synagogue is now a private house close to the mosque in the Ihartane neighborhood.

But still today, after 50 years or more, the old people of Tinghir remember with nostalgia the time when the Jews were part of the landscape, and these same Jews now in Israel have not forgotten their old life in the Atlas Mountains.

THE FILMMAKER’S INTENTIONS

The following excellent quote from the great historian, Jean-Pierre Vernant, a leading intellectual concerned with the battles of his time, who guided me towards the creation realisation of my first work:

To become oneself, one must project oneself towards that which is different; persist in it and by it. To live enclosed within an identity is to lose oneself and cease to be. Self-knowledge is built by contact, exchange, in the company of the other. Man is a bridge between the banks of the self and the other.

It seems to me that this is what my film is about: to give value to our cultural diversity and to do that through recovering our collective history.
Revisiting our numerous dual memories is both a moral and political obligation. Moroccan Judaism is a product of the land. And it's only far away from the land of his birth that the Moroccan Jew recovers his memory. This story must be studied in all its complexity, without repeating the history and reasons for the departures. Beginning here, we can attempt to tell the story. The 'Moroccan-ness' of this memory is expressed in customs, a way of life, languages and religious practices, for example the worship of saints shared by fellow countrymen who were Muslim.

The town where I was born, Tinghir, perched 1500 m up between the High and Anti Atlas Mountains, sheltered a large Jewish community of Toshavim (native Jews). While their presence there spanned 2000 years, now there is emptiness and no trace of them save the empty houses and the dead who lie in the town's two cemeteries.

I was born in Tinghir in the Moroccan High Atlas. My father immigrated to Paris in July 1968, just a few years after the departure for Israel of the last Jews of Tinghir. But unlike them, he was not a captive migrant: he often came back to the village and maintained a strong relationship with Morocco. In 1971 he married Khadija, my mother, and when we were reunited as a family in France, I was just 6 months old. So my French history started, but it was built on a frequent coming and going between France and Morocco. My attachment to Morocco was built during our annual summer holidays.

From the beginning I was confronted by questions of identity and integration posed by all children of immigrants. These questions, which I was led to ask of my multiple identities from obviously an external point of view, would no doubt have been impossible had I not been a 'child of the Mediterranean': not simply Moroccan or French; a child who would spend his time travelling between one culture and another to confront his questions from this unstable starting point (to paraphrase Derrida). It is from this point of view, both involved and without taking sides, that I made my film.

During my childhood, Tinghir was the place for holidays. It was a return to the land, and I lived it as though it were time travel. My grandparents took me back to my Amazigh roots and allowed me to recover fragments of this identity. It was while listening to their tales that I discovered that some Amazigh were Jews. I had always associated the word Jewish with the terrible story of the Holocaust. And so, in my child's head, I was astonished to find that an Amazigh could be anything other than Muslim: those around me had shattered that belief and this no doubt opened up other perspectives. How could such an ancient presence suddenly disappear? This first query led me to question my grandparents and the old folk of the town.

I remember that when reading *Mille Ans, Un Jour* (A Thousand Years, One Day) by Edmond Amran El Maleh, whom I had the good fortune to meet and to film before his death, I came to feel this wrenching from the earth. Behind those 'thousand years', one can well imagine the imprints left by the Jews in on the country, and in 'one day', the images that came to me were suitcases and the cars that took them to ports and airports. It is sad that his works are not taught in schools. I wanted to show what happened to those who left their world, their imaginary social world. I developed great empathy for these exiles. During my first meeting
with the great writer, I tried to understand what haunted me in this story of the absent Jews; he simply told me that I could have been one of them…

In the film, I draw a parallel with my own exile, the only difference being that I have a house to return to, while the Jews left everything behind them.

My childhood was coloured by the old town, with its houses made from rammed earth and its steep lanes. The tales of my grandparents took me to a world that would never disappear – of the origins, of the times when Muslims and Jews lived together. This enclosed space symbolises the labyrinth of my origin that is written for ever in my Moroccan Amazigh identity.

The echoes of the mellah, today emptied of its inhabitants, still resonate in memories. Inhabited by this absence, I searched in the labyrinth of my own Franco-Moroccan identity for traces of this Jewish otherness, which I considered a loss. Today, as I walk through the mellah of the old town, I try to imagine the melodies of the Hebrew songs heard through the windows of the synagogue. My mother was fed matzo, called chitoto in Amazigh, and my great-grandfather bought his shop from a Jew in the town called Israel N’Chya.

For our generation, it’s difficult to imagine this Jewish-Berber coexistence. Is what happened in the space of 50 years such that this 2,000-year-old reality has become inconceivable for those of my generation? It was based on from the basis of this question that I wanted to find the Jews who left in the 1960s.

Ever since my first trip to Israel, I had a secret ambition to find the missing Jews. And in the end, my many journeys to Israel allowed me to indeed find some of the Berber Jews of my generation whose parents were originally from Tinghir. I understood that this same question was asked by them, too. Although their experience was different from mine, they must have been confronted with questions of identity and integration in Israel. And they must also have questioned what happened that caused their parents to leave the Atlas so suddenly with no hope of returning and without maintaining any contact. Along with my alter egos, it was a case of underlining this sharing of a common memory. Consequently we became accomplices very quickly. For them, this research into roots is vital because it is also a way of affirming their place in Israeli society.

Thanks to them, I met some old people who had lived in the Atlas. These people brought with them fragments of the history of Tinghir. I had the feeling that one part of our history would be found with them. When I found myself face to face with these old people, it was as though I was with my grandparents. I discovered the same words, the same warmth, and the same generosity. They had not forgotten their languages, traditions, neighbours. Hearing the old women singing Ahidous songs (Amazigh poetry) was to allow those with preconceptions of the other to understand that this other resembles us and that we have cultural territory in common. I also wanted to understand the reasons for their departure, but above all to work on the perceptions of the exile, of having been wrenched from their land, to try to elaborate on the anthropology of memory. The photographs of Elias Harrus, taken in southern Morocco at the time when he was working to develop a network of schools for the Universal Jewish
Alliance, bear witness to traces of a civilisation that has disappeared. Hearing an elderly Muslim immigrant who had lived intimately with a Jewish family sing the Shabbat prayers in Hebrew or recite the Shema Yisrael, is simply unbelievable and moving for us all.

I wanted to share this unusual history of the place of my origin at a time when withdrawing into one’s community is a strong and worldwide phenomenon, particularly in France, Israel and Morocco.

In fact, in the western world where I grew up, it has become unthinkable that Jews and Muslims could share the same space, let alone the same culture. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict that pollutes relations between these two communities certainly counts for something in this so-called impossibility. It also seems to me essential to see and listen to this common life, in the context where young generations in Morocco, Israel and France are cut off from part of their history that doesn’t appear in school textbooks. And all the more so as these young people, who have to deal with identity issues related to migration, often ignore the plurality of their cultures of origin.

In recording individual destinies within a collective history, I wanted to show how nationalism and the handling of the question relating to one’s land have contributed to the destruction of this Judeo-Berber coexistence. For these Berber Jews and Muslims, attachment to the land is central: they manoeuvre it endeavouring to find either navigate between endeavouring to find either their roots or a time of nomadism.

Through this personal quest, I wanted to reveal universal questions. Such questions have a very contemporary resonance. In fact, in this voyage between recollection and the forgotten, the film attempts to show reshaped identity among people who have been displaced. In unearthing this buried part of Moroccan Amazigh and Israeli identity, it seems that these identities travel beyond frontiers. They start to be accommodated (sometimes with difficulty) with other cultural affiliations. Our identity is not fixed, it moves and is always under construction with others. This is a film about a wrenching from the earth, exile, absence and yet at the same time the possibility of renewal and stitching together of the threads of our histories.

My film is one way of mourning the loss of this Judeo-Berber life in order to prepare the groundwork for the future. With my Jewish alter egos, we have recreated these links that history had broken. This particular identity (Amazigh) was enriched by contact with other cultural influences.

In retracing and gathering individual stories from two generations of Amazigh Berbers, Jews and Muslims, my intention has been to breathe life back into the riches and diversity of Amazigh identity that was once a Jewish-Muslim melting pot.
CONCLUSION

It is vital that a generation of amnesiacs does not develop. The great Arab-Berber Muslim civilisation must acknowledge its Amazigh and Jewish components. Young Moroccan children learn a history that has been mutilated by the removal of this dimension: secondary school curriculums make little of this presence. Moroccan Jews, wherever they are, hold a deep attachment to their native land. It is only fair that it should have a place in their memories. Morocco can be proud of all who have contributed: Jewish, Christian, Berber, Andalous, Arab and Muslim. It is the promise of justice and the future. A democratic country is also measured by the way in which it includes its minorities in the national narrative, as well as by the way in which it recognises the riches brought by these same minorities. The history of Morocco is composed of multiple identities: let us use this diversity to advantage in the fight against fanaticism and intolerance.

My film provoked much debate in Morocco after its screening on the Moroccan television channel, 2M. A reactionary, populist minority felt that making a film about this question represented some kind of normalisation of relations with Israel. Do such people deny the historical reality of our dual history? Do they call into question an article of our Constitution that recognises the plurality of our identities?

An anthropologist friend told me during a colloquium that I had held up a mirror to Moroccan society showing its diversity, and that the most reactionary Moroccans (those nostalgic for pan-Arabism, Islamists) would not be able to appreciate it as for them, only an Arab-Muslim identity has the right to exist.

I can understand that my film disturbed them as it is a hymn to otherness and to plural identities. ‘It is only when there is another than we know who we are’.
PRESS REVIEWS

- Jacques Morice, Télérama, 9 October 2013:

‘A personal documentary that restores broken ties and emphasises touching reunions.’

- Jacques Mandelbaum, Le Monde, 9 October 2013:

‘Tinghir Jerusalem: Echoes from the Mellah – shadow of lost peace’

The writer of this film, Kamal Hachkar, is a 33-year-old history teacher who emigrated from his native Morocco to France at the age of 6 months. A pilgrimage to the Berber village of his forefathers, Tinghir, revealed the long cohabitation of Jews and Muslims in this region, before the majority of Moroccan Jews left for the new state of Israel in the 1950s. Kamal tries to understand the reasons why they left. First he speaks with the village elders, and then leaves for Israel where he finds the Jews of Tinghir; some of the descendants, of his own age, share his curiosity for this common past.

There is undeniably something beautiful and moving in watching this young Franco-Moroccan challenging political dissent by coming to speak in such a friendly fashion with these Israeli citizens. His approach clearly challenges the alleged inevitability of Jewish-Arab conflict. Unfortunately, though, there is also little consolation given the overwhelming historical forces that led to Jewish Arabs leaving their country of origin in vast numbers. In the case of Morocco, the film does not clearly answer the question of why they left; there are many reasons for this phenomenon, according to those he spoke to. A deeper understanding of these reasons is what should have concerned Kamal Hachkar, a teacher who clearly prefers a sentimental approach, though that is no less commendable.’

- Extract from the publication Berbères by Eric Fottorino, 2012:

Before going back to Fez, on our return from the desert, we stopped at Tinghir, a wonderfully green and peaceful setting in an arid and rocky land just at the entrance to the Todra Valley. Here, in the 1960s, Zionist groups took a census of Berber Jews before encouraging them to ‘make aliyah’, that is, to go and live in Israel. And so, one fine day, all left their native land to go to the land of Zion. Those who lived in peace and friendship with the Muslims of Tinghir soon understood that things would not be the same with their Muslim neighbours in the Israeli nation. It is evident they were wrenched from their land, and one must watch the 2011 documentary Tinghir Jerusalem: Echoes from the Mellah, by one of their descendants, Kamal Hachkar, to measure the intensity of their distress when they were brutally cut off from their past. The scenes where elderly Berber women from Tinghir sing of their pain and sorrow in their rabbit hutch houses tears at the heart. Likewise, sadness afflicted their Muslim friends left behind in Morocco who cried for ‘their’ Berber Jews. Half a century after this wrenching separation, one can still find representatives of this community in Israel who have not forgotten their native land, or their language, or their lost happiness.’
- By Lamia Berrada Berca, writer:

‘Tinghir Jerusalem: Echoes from the Mellah, a documentary showing the junction between two communities

Awakening the hidden Jewish heritage of Tinghir, Kamal Hachkar’s documentary reveals the dual nature of the culture and history of Morocco. The film concerns the bond between the Jewish and Muslim communities, underscored by a common memory and rich past of some 2000 years; an essential work, one that bears witness and preserves memory, protecting it from the forces of neglect and forgetfulness.

Concerning certain topics, the facts surrounding one’s birth proves who one is, and reveals to Moroccans their plural identity. This is the case with Tinghir Jerusalem: Echoes from the Mellah, Kamal Hachkar’s first film. The title tells us of the necessary interconnection between two territories that are geographically far apart, and for which he tries to assemble scattered memories. Having won the prize for a first film at the national film festival in Tangier, while fundamentalist Islamists launched their polemic with a brutality that the young director could not have expected, this documentary tells the story of a long history full of joy and success. The film has won many prizes wherever it has been shown: in Morocco, Spain, Israel, Geneva and France, at a time marked by conflict and tension.’
SELECTED AT THE FOLLOWING FESTIVALS AND AWARDED

THE FOLLOWING PRIZES:

• Festival International des Droits Humains, Rabat, 2012: Driss Benzekri Grand Prix for best film

• Festival MEDIMED, Barcelona, 2012: Ahmed Attia Award for dialogue between cultures

• World Jewish Film Festival - Jewish Eye: First prize in the documentary film category

• Festival National du Film, Tangier, 2013: Prize for best first film

• Festival International du Film Oriental, Geneva, 2013: Special mention

• Festival International du Film Berbère, Paris, 2013: Best documentary prize

• Festival International du Cinéma de Mémoire Commune, Nador, 2013: Best documentary film prize; public prize; local press prize

• Festival Lumière d’Afrique, Besançon 2013: Eden Prize for best documentary film

The film has been selected at many international festivals including Hamburg, Montreal, Valladolid, Rome, Los Angeles, New York, Washington, Toronto, London, Brussels and Boston.
Kamal Hachkar and his grandfather Baha in the heart of the Jewish Quarter of Tinghir

Kamal and his grandfather
Old Man of Asfalou

High School Students of Tinghir
KAMAL, SEBBAG AND DANIEL

HANNA, AICHA AND KAMAL
Aicha and Hannah in Yavné, South of Tel Aviv

Aicha Heats the Bendir
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